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Abstract An ‘Information Centre’ has recently been
established by law which has the power to collect, collate and
provide access to the medical information for all patients
treated by the National Health Service in England, whether in
hospitals or by General Practitioners. This so-called ‘care.-
data’ scheme has given rise to major and ongoing contro-
versies. We will sketch the background of the scheme and
look at the responses it has elicited from citizens and medical
professionals. In Autumn 2013, NHS England set up a
care.data website where citizens could record their concerns
regarding the collection of health-related data by the Infor-
mation Centre. We have reviewed all the comments on this
website up until June 2015. We have also analysed the
readers’ comments on the coverage of the care.data scheme
in one of the main national UK newspapers. When discussing
the responses of citizens, we will make a distinction between
the problems that citizens detect and the solutions they
propose. The solutions that are being perceived as the most
relevant ones can be summarized as follows: citizens wish to
further the common good without being manipulated into
doing it, while at the same time being safeguarded against
various abuses. The issue of trust turns out to figure promi-
nently. Our analysis of reactions to the scheme in no way
pretends to be exhaustive, yet it provides various relevant
insights into the concerns identified by citizens as well as
medical professionals. These concerns, moreover, have a
more general relevance in relation to other contexts of
medical data-mining as well as biobank research. Our anal-
ysis also offers important pointers as to how those concerns
might be addressed.
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Introduction
In 2012, the UK Parliament passed the Health and Social
Care Act (HSCA). This law was introduced despite promises
of the Conservative Party before the elections of 2010 not to
carry out reforms of the UK’s National Health Service
(NHS).1 One of the most significant changes resulting from
the 2012 Act, which has been severely criticized, was the
reduction of the Secretary of State for Health’s obligation to
provide universal health care to UK citizens.2
Buried within this massive Act were provisions estab-
lishing the creation of an ‘Information Centre’, a body
corporate with the power to collect, collate and provide
access to the medical information for all patients treated by
the NHS in England, whether in hospitals or by General
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1 Meanwhile, members of the Conservative Party seem to have
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Practitioners (GPs). Previously, i.e. before the enactment of
the HSCA, patients’ hospital data had already been col-
lected and made available to researchers and others by the
NHS Information Centre (set up by the Health and Social
Care Act 2010), the forerunner to the Information Centre
(referred to by the NHS as the HSC Information Centre or
HSCIC), and GPs had already started using standardised
computerised record-keeping systems but these records
were not transferred to a central database.
The report Innovation Health and Wealth, Accelerating
Adoption and Diffusion in the NHS, known as the Car-
ruthers report,3 discussed the uses to which the data col-
lected by the new Information Centre might be put.4 This
report provided indications that the hospital data have been
used for purposes that are not strictly healthcare related
(see below). With the background that there was concern
that personal medical data might be used to individuals’
disadvantage or without due attention to maintaining con-
fidentiality, a bill to amend the HSCA was brought forward
in 2013 and signed into law in May 2014 as the Care Act
2014. This was none too soon as the harvesting of GP data
by the Information Centre under the so-called ‘care.data’
scheme had been due to begin in Spring 2014.
The aim of this paper is threefold. First, we describe
recent developments regarding the care.data scheme in the
UK, including reactions from the medical community
(which are discussed in the same section in view of the fact
that they have had a clear impact on developments regarding
the scheme). Second, we analyse and discuss concerns cit-
izens have expressed regarding this scheme, on the NHS
website as well as in one of the main national newspapers.
Third, we relate these concerns to general discussions
regarding governance and consent strategies that allow
valuable research to proceed while still preserving the
interests of research participants and the general public.
Background of the care.data scheme and concerns
expressed by the medical profession
On its website,5 the NHS states that it has developed the
care.data programme as an initiative ‘‘to ensure that there is
more rounded information available to citizens, patients,
clinicians, researchers and the people that plan health and
care services’’, and ‘‘to ensure that the best possible evidence
is available to improve the quality of care for all.’’ Among the
benefits of the scheme are mentioned: the possibility for
researchers to ‘‘identify patterns in disease and the most
effective treatments’’; the possibility ‘‘to find more effective
ways of preventing or managing illnesses; advise local
decision makers how best to meet the needs of local com-
munities; promote public health by monitoring risks of dis-
ease spread; map out pathways of care to streamline
inefficiencies and reduce waiting times; determine how to
use NHS resources most fairly and efficiently.’’
The potential positive impact of the care.data programme
has been acknowledged by various organisations. The idea of
better use of existing data was already advanced in 2013 in a
joint statement of the Royal College of General Practitioners,
the British Medical Association, NHS England and the
HSCIC: ‘‘Greater transparency and better use of data to
improve the quality of patient care are ambitions we can all
support. Anyone making healthcare decisions needs access
to high quality information: doctors need it to inform their
clinical decision making; patients need it when deciding
which treatment is best for them; and commissioners need it
when making decisions about which services are right for
their populations.’’6 In a separate press release in December
2014, the Royal College of General Practioners acknowl-
edged that: ‘‘care data is a vitally important project that has
the capacity to bring enormous health benefits to patients up
and down the country’’.7
However, the scheme has met with a lot of opposition. In
Autumn 2013, NHS England had set up a care.data website
where citizens could record their concerns, and an information
leaflet on care.data had been sent to all English households in
early new year 2014. The leaflets resembled junk mail and
were binned unread by many. However, public concern rose, as
did concern among GPs. Many patients began to take advan-
tage of the opportunity to opt out that the Secretary of State for
Health had offered (even though the HSCA does not itself
provide for the opportunity for opting out and there is no cer-
tainty that the offer might not quietly be withdrawn one day).
With many GPs showing concern, and with one Oxford-
based GP in particular threatening to opt all his patients out
of the scheme, the government decided to delay GP data
harvesting until Autumn 2014 to allow NHS England the
opportunity to persuade GPs, healthcare workers and
patients that the care.data scheme was valuable and that
sufficient safeguards had been put in place. Again, just in
time since in June 2014 the Partridge Report8 on worrying
data misuse by the forerunner to the HSCIC was published.9
3 Department of Health (2011).
4 See Sterckx and Cockbain (2014).
5 http://www.england.nhs.uk/ourwork/tsd/care-data/better-care/.
6 http://bma.org.uk/search?query=Care.data%20-%20Joint%20statement.
7 http://www.rcgp.org.uk/news/2014/december/rcgp-response-to-care-
data-report.aspx.
8 Partridge (2014).
9 Indeed, the pressure group medConfidential reported in its Bulletin
of 5 September 2014 that ‘Minutes published by the revived Data
Access Advisory Group (DAGG) at HSCIC earlier this week revealed
that an unnamed organisation has been using HES and ONS data ‘‘for
commercial activity in addition to the purposes they had stated when
applying for approval’’.’ See https://medconfidential.org/2014/med
confidential-bulletin-5-september-2014.
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Moreover, it was decided to begin GP data harvesting
within a group of ‘pathfinder’ areas in England,10 and to
initiate a series of public discussion sessions with the
Care.data Advisory Group. A recent report suggests that
data harvesting might begin as early as June 2015.11 An
earlier report from the same source indicated that, initially
at least, data would go not to the general research database
of the HSCIC but to a ‘quarantined’ half-way house.12
GP support for the care.data scheme seems to be weak,
with a report in August 2014 of a survey of GPs showing
one-third likely to opt their patients out if NHS England
rejects the call by the British Medical Association (BMA)
for the scheme to be based on patients opting in:
Almost a third of GPs say they intend to opt their
patients out of the care.data scheme if NHS England
doesn’t accept calls for the scheme to be run on an
opt-in basis.
Pulse’s survey of more than 400 GPs reveals that
31 % of respondents said they would opt patients out
- despite this being unlawful - while only 32 % said
they would not be opting patients out. …
Many GPs also said that inadequate safeguards and
lack [of] clarity of where data can be shared and what
it can be used for were behind their decision to opt
patients out. …
… a GP in Crawley said that … : ‘Care.data is a
fantastic research tool and used properly could help
drive change that will benefit us all. The problem is
that the central bureaucracy of the NHS has ignored
the rights of individuals.’ …
… a GP in Ecclestone, Lancashire, said: ‘Initially
most patients are willing to join the scheme as they
feel it is a good idea if the emergency doctors knew
about their medical conditions.’ ‘But once [we have]
explained that their records could be seen by non-
medical people and could be used for pharmaceutical
research purposes, they seek to withdraw consent.’13
The BMA’s position on care.data, adopted at the Annual
Representative Meeting in July 2014, is as follows:
That this Meeting agrees that the care.data system
should not continue in its present form as:
i) it lacks confidentiality and there is a possibility for
individual patient data to be identified;
ii) it carries the risk of GPs losing the trust of their
patients who may feel constrained in confiding in
them;
iii) the future potential users of the data are not well
defined;
iv) it should be an opt-in system rather than an opt-out
one;
v) the data should only be used for its stated purpose
for improving patient care and not sold for profit.14
The amendments to the HSCA passed in the Care Act 2014
go some way towards addressing the concerns regarding
confidentiality and inappropriate use of patient health data,
not least by specifying in Section 122 that Section 261
HSCA is amended to allow data release only: ‘for the
purposes of—the provision of health care or adult social
care, or the promotion of health.’ However, the precise
boundary imposed by this amendment is unclear. It seems
clear that the amendment excludes making the data
available to actuaries for the purpose of determining life
insurance policy terms. However, it clearly does not
prevent the data from being made available to drug
researchers and pharmaceutical firms.
It is appropriate therefore to question just what infor-
mation is to be harvested from patients’ GP records, and
indeed whether a patient has any right to block such use. In
this regard, the advice to GPs given by NHS England itself
is of interest:
Under the Health and Social Care Act 2012, NHS
England has the power to direct the HSCIC to collect
information from all providers of NHS care, includ-
ing general practices. … Guidance will support
General Practices by explaining how patient infor-
mation will be collected, anonymised and used by
commissioners so they can better understand the true
outcome of care provided to patients and continu-
ously improve health services for all.
The General Practice Extraction Service (GPES) will
be used to extract GP data each month. The identifiers
to be extracted are: NHS number, date of birth,
postcode, and gender which will allow patients’ GP
data to be linked to their hospital data. No free text
will be extracted, only coded information about
referrals, NHS prescriptions and other clinical data.15
Moreover, the GP readers were directed to a blog, on NHS
patient information and the Data Protection Act (DPA), of
10 Apparently, in the ‘pathfinder’ areas ‘there will be lots of activity:
local media work, and a new set of communication materials,
including a letter sent by name to every patient, will be used to raise
awareness of the programme and support GPs prior to a period of data
extraction in those areas only in early 2015.’ See http://www.
healthwatchwalthamforest.co.uk/news/caredata-oct-2014.
11 See medConfidential Bulletin (2015) https://medconfidential.org/
2015/medconfidential-bulletin-1-june-2015.
12 See medConfidential Bulletin, 5 September 2014, above, note 9.
13 Matthews-King (2014).
14 http://bma.org.uk/practical-support-at-work/ethics/confidentiality-
and-health-records/care-data.
15 http://www.england.nhs.uk/ourwork/tsd/care-data/gp-guidance/.
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the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), i.e. the
official body set up to enforce and oversee data related
legislation. The ICO explains that:
GPs holding personal information about patients is
nothing new and is covered squarely by the DPA.
Generally everyone understands what’s happening:
you give personal information to your GP who then
records that information as your medical history. This
record may include information from other health
services and allows your GP to track your health
throughout your lifetime.
The changes begin with some of the personal infor-
mation included in that record going from GPs to the
Information Centre. This happens under the direction
of NHS England, which is allowed due to a new law,
the Health and Social Care Act 2012.
This law gives NHS England the right to direct the
Information Centre to collect certain sorts of data
from the medical records. The law is a statutory
enactment which requires the disclosure of the data,
which means the data becomes exempt from the main
parts of the DPA [Data Protection Act].
Because the main parts of the DPA are exempt it
means that neither GPs (as data controller) or patients
(as data subjects) have the right to stop that infor-
mation being taken into the Information Centre –
there is no legal ‘opt out’ under the DPA.
But while the DPA doesn’t give patients a right to
object, the Secretary of State for Health has offered
patients an option not to have their information used
in this way. But as this option isn’t covered by the
DPA, we can’t regulate it, and we don’t set the rules
on how it works.16
As is clear, the option to opt out of care.data is not
overseen by the Information Commissioner’s Office, and,
as we noted earlier, this option is not guaranteed by law.
Moreover, the legal basis for the care.data scheme
‘trumps’ key provisions of the Data Protection Act.17 The
2012 Act (the HSCA) allows all patient data to be used for
purposes that extend beyond patient care (e.g. for research)
without any consultation, i.e. without the patients’ knowl-
edge. Thus, the law makes it impossible for patients to
prevent their data from being used for research. Yet under
the Data Protection Act 1998 (S 2(1)(a), Part II, Schedule
1), any health professional gathering personal information
directly from a patient has a responsibility to advise the
patient of the intended uses of the information, unless this
would be impracticable. As Jamie Grace and Mark Taylor
have convincingly argued, in this regard the Data Protec-
tion Act may be overridden by the HSCA, since the direct
recipient of the information from the patient, the patient’s
physician, is obliged to forward such information to the
HSCIC which itself is not obliged to inform the patient of
the use of such data once ‘anonymised’.18 This has far-
reaching consequences:
[T]he Information Centre will have the power, under
Section 259 [of the HSCA], to require confidential
patient information (and other information) from
health and social care bodies…19 [A] disclosure to
the Information Centre, in response to a requirement
that it be provided,… will not constitute a breach of
the common law duty of confidence and will satisfy
the requirement that there is a lawful basis for the
processing of sensitive personal data under Schedule
3 of the Data Protection Act 1998.20
Consequently, as observed by Grace and Taylor, the right
of a patient to object to processing of his personal data on
the basis that it would be likely to cause ‘substantial
damage or substantial distress to him or to another, and that
damage or distress is or would be unwarranted’ (cf.
Section 10 of the Data Protection Act 1998) is simply
removed as a result of the HSCA:
[T]he responsibility to consult the patient and provide
her with the opportunity to object] is lifted in relation
to both the Information Centre and health profes-
sionals if disclosure of the information has been
required by the Information Centre.21
Following long-existing UK government practice in rela-
tion to governmental ICT schemes, both the HSCIC22 and
NHS England23 have produced ‘Privacy Impact Assess-
ments’ in relation to the potential impacts on patient
privacy of the operations of the HSCIC and of the care.data
scheme respectively. These are particularly of concern on
two points—the extent to which citizens’ registered opt-
outs will be honoured and the awareness of NHS England
of ethical concerns extending beyond the potential for harm
if medical confidentiality is breached. These Privacy
Impact Assessments will be returned to below.
16 Monaghan (2014) see: https://iconewsblog.wordpress.com/2014/
01/27/ico-blog-nhs-patient-information-and-the-data-protection-act/.
17 Grace and Taylor (2013).
18 Grace and Taylor, above, note 17.
19 Grace and Taylor, above, note 17, at 430.
20 Grace and Taylor, above, note 17, at 432 (footnotes omitted).
21 Grace and Taylor, above, note 17, at 435–436 (emphasis added).
22 See http://www.hscic.gov.uk/media/12931/Privacy-Impact-Assess
ment/pdf/privacy_impact_assessment_2013.pdf.
23 See http://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/pia-
care-data.pdf. We thank Dr Edgar Whitley for bringing this to our
attention.
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As shown in this section, key elements of the discus-
sions regarding the care.data scheme are focused around
the following topics: appropriate consent mechanisms for
data collection and use; the right to object to processing of
personal data; the extent of the data collected; and the uses
of the data by the NHS or third parties. Various of those
concerns were also raised by citizens, as we will see in the
following section.
Citizens’ reactions to care.data
As mentioned earlier, in Autumn 2013, NHS England set
up a care.data website where citizens could record their
concerns regarding the collection of health-related data by
the HSCIC. Early in 2014, an information leaflet on
care.data was sent to all English households.
In this Section, we will provide a few examples of the many
comments that have been posted on the care.data website. We
have reviewed all the comments on this website up until 1 June
2015.24 As of that date, the NHS England care.data blog
contained 201 blog entries.25 From the blogger names given,
171 individual bloggers were responsible for the 201 entries.
However, it cannot be ruled out that individual bloggers may
have used more than one blogger name.
The analysis involved extracting from the 201 entries
the separate points of concern raised by the bloggers and
subsequently identifying generic headings under which
these points of concern could be categorised. These generic
categories were not identified in advance, but instead
emerged from the analysis of the comments made by the
bloggers. The method of thematic analysis was used, i.e. a
qualitative research method for identifying, analysing and
reporting themes within data.26 Hence the points of con-
cern were not quantified, i.e. we did not determine which
were most frequently or least frequently raised. The iden-
tification and analysis of themes was done independently
by authors SS and JC. Any differences in categorisation or
analysis were discussed by all the authors and consensus
was always reached.
The purpose of our analysis was to identify the generic
categories of citizens’ concerns from the blog entries and,
subsequently, to compare those with the types of concern
raised by medical professionals and by the NHS itself. To
broaden the data set used for the analysis of citizens’ con-
cerns, and to check whether there might be any further
generic categories for points of concern amongst the public,
it was decided to review the blog entries invited by one of the
United Kingdom’s major and renowned national newspa-
pers. The UK has four newspapers in this category, The
Independent, The Times, The Daily Telegraph, and The
Guardian. The Times was excluded because its blog is
accessible only to subscribers. The Guardian was chosen
because of its relatively extensive coverage of the care.data
scheme. Two blogs from The Guardian were chosen.27 These
blogs concerned articles which respectively might prompt
concern and calm about the scheme. From the blogger
names, which overlapped to some extent, it appeared that
blog entries were made by a total of 85 individuals. It is quite
possible that there was some overlap between the bloggers on
The Guardian’s website and those on NHS England’s web-
site. The blog entries were analysed in the same manner as
those for the NHS England care.data blog but with the gen-
eric categories identified from the NHS England care.data
blog already in place. No new generic categories were found.
To be clear, we do not imply that the comments in these
three blogs are representative of the UK population. The
bloggers are a sample of self-selected citizens who have
voiced concerns regarding the sharing of health data.
However, their comments do give us very clear and useful
pointers as to the concerns that figure prominently within
the population. Although the UK is of course only one
case, the issues that have been raised by the bloggers are
highly relevant and can serve as an excellent basis for
future investigations of the issue of health data sharing.
Seven major concerns were raised by citizens about the
care.data scheme: lack of transparency; lack of respect for
confidentiality and privacy; misgivings about the opt-out
scheme; erosion of trust in GPs and the health care system;
wrongful appropriation of personal property; commercial-
isation; and uses of personal health data that conflict with
the person’s moral values.
Lack of transparency
First, various citizens point to a lack of transparency and
complain that the care.data scheme has been insufficiently
advertised or even advertised in a way designed to be
misleading. The belief that they lack sufficient information,
frequently augmented by the suspicion that information is
24 http://www.nhs.uk/NHSEngland/thenhs/records/healthrecords/Pages/
care-data.aspx.
25 Of these, the first 189 were analysed in the initial study for this
paper. The remaining 12 were analysed during the revision and
review process of the paper, but were found to contain no additional
points of concern.
26 Braun and Clarke (2006).
27 The blogs relate to the article ‘NHS patient data audit uncovers
‘significant lapses’ in confidentiality’, 17 June 2014 (available at
http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/jun/17/nhs-patient-data-audit-
significant-lapses-confidentiality-hscic [last accessed 1 June 2015]),
as well as the article ‘How care.data could help save lives’, 18 August
2014 (available at http://www.theguardian.com/healthcare-network/
2014/aug/18/care-data-confidentiality-help-save-lives-health-nhs [last
accessed 1 June 2015]). The authors of the second article are
employed by a data customer of a forerunner of the HSCIC.
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being withheld on purpose, is clearly mirrored in the fol-
lowing statements of citizens:
This NHS datacare leaflet was dropped through my door
with a take-away promotional leaflet so I nearly threw
them both away by mistake. Perhaps that is exactly what
the NHS hopes will happen. Care.data, 14.01.14
You couldn’t have made the leaflet look more like
junk mail if you’d tried; I assume that was deliberate
so that people wouldn’t know about it and therefore
wouldn’t opt out. Care.data, 30.01.14
The lack of publicity about the biggest change in the
relationship between GP and patients is little short of
a national disgrace. Care.data, 17.02.14
I have no particular problem with the general idea of
data sharing, but I am greatly concerned about the
underhand way in which this is being done. Like (ap-
parently) the majority here my husband and I received
[sic] no notification of this, nor were there public
messages informing the public that this information
was coming (or supposed to be). Care.data, 20.02.14
No information has been circulated - even the local
GP surgery knows nothing and has no information.
Come on - this is a disaster. I refuse to accept that a
serious effort was made to inform the public - rather
you hoped we would sleep walk into accepting the
collection of our data. Care.data, 19.02.14
Lack of respect for confidentiality and privacy
Second, various citizens express the fear that personal
health data might be accessible to and/or obtained by
others, particularly insurance companies, employers and
recruitment agencies. The following quotes illustrate this
fear of a lack of respect for confidentiality and privacy.
It is a total disregard of our privacy, Care.data,
13.01.14
Despite all the assurances here and elsewhere about
privacy and security, I have absolutely no faith that
my data will be secure. There have been numerous
recent instances of data loss, hacking and other
breaches of supposedly secure government networks
(pensions, benefits and records armed-service per-
sonnel, for instance). And those are just the mishaps
they haven’t been able to cover up. I see no reason to
believe that this new database will be any more
secure. Care.data, 20.01.14
I am concerned that even anonymised information
could be combined with other information that’s
easily available to de-anonymise and identify me. I’m
also concerned that other moves that are planned for
the future will further erode patient confidentiality
beyond what has already been published. Care.data,
04.02.14
As I appreciate it, the amount of detail included within
one’s personal records would easily allow direct
identification of individuals. Allowing such full per-
sonal information to go outside the NHS will enable
commercial organisations to target individuals. It may
take time for the risks to become appreciated but
information will gradually migrate outwards into
possibly unscrupulous hands. Care.data, 13.02.14
The care.data/HSCIC health record data extract
seems to drive a coach and horses through the Data
Protection Act and the Human Rights laws. Care.-
data, 12.02.14
There are very good reasons to fear that so called
secure systems will be breached, either through
incompetence or special interests, as they have in the
past. I do not believe that my information will be kept
secure and therefore do not trust this system. I forbid
this sharing of my personal data. I did not sign up for
dissemination of my health records. The NHS may
regard me as just a statistic, but that is not the point of
my participation in public health care. Care.data,
20.10.14
Drunk driving’s still an offence even if you don’t
have an accident, because society thinks the potential
of harm is sufficient. Are you seriously saying that
medical confidentiality only matters in retrospect if
the failure causes explicit harm, rather the potential
for harm? The Guardian, 19.08.14
Misgivings about the opt-out scheme
Third, various citizens express strong misgivings about the
opt-out scheme. Citizens express dissatisfaction that deci-
sions about them are being taken without them being con-
sulted or being able to consent. This is seen to apply not
only to the individuals raising this concern but also to rel-
atives who are unable to give consent, for example minors.
I object strongly to having to opt out of this rather
than opt in. Care.data, 21.01.14
… How do newborns opt out? How do children opt
out? How do the mentally disabled opt out? What if
my partner and I can’t agree as to whether our chil-
dren should be opted in or out? In out in out shake it
all about? Care.data, 28.01.14
If care.data is so manifestly in the interests of all, why
don’t you take the obvious ethical approach, and
make it OPT-IN by default? Care.data, 22.02.14
I agree totally it should be an Opt in situation not opt
out, surely they have to have permission? Care.data,
13.01.14
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This is basically a decision made for me, without me.
Care.data, 01.03.14
the need to actively opt out, and the absence of any
official form for doing so is an absolute disgrace.
Care.data, 20.01.14
I … object to the way in which they are making it
hard for people to opt out - why is there no form for
people to fill in and have forwarded to their own
medical practice. Care.data, 24.01.14
There is no information on how to opt out, or even an
opt out form. Care.data, 29.01.14
Erosion of trust in GPs and the health care system
Fourth, various citizens point to an erosion of trust in GPs
and the health care system. They fear that the care.data
scheme will make it difficult or impossible for them to
continue to trust their doctor and their healthcare system:
Patients will not confide in their doctor, certain per-
sonal information, that may be absolutely necessary
for diagnoses and treatment, knowing that outside
agencies may have access to it. Care.data, 26.02.14
It is a disgrace and will prevent patients being honest
with their GP Care.data, 01.03.14
I do not trust the government with my data, and now I
cannot trust my doctor o[r] the wider NHS. Care.data,
05.05.14
The NHS has to build trust, and it won’t do that with
emotional blackmail and hysterical claims that people
will die if we can’t sell your data. This didn’t work
before, and it’s still nonsense now. The Guardian,
18.08.14 (emphasis in original)
I would welcome the good that could come from
care.data and would welcome the gifting of informa-
tion from individuals who make up the community for
the common good. But they (care.data) blew it. They
blew it by being patronizing and disingenuous and by
being unlucky enough to be preceded by Wikileaks
exposures. They need to regain trust by apologizing for
their previous abject failure and then by persuading us
as individuals that a properly anonymised, secure
version is safe and effective. The Guardian, 18.08.14
They should have been more open about the users.
They didn’t have adequate criteria to decide who
should get the data. And I’d add this needs to be
clarified further going forward, because the [2014]
Care Act wording is not specific and not well com-
municated to the public. Perhaps most importantly I’d
disagree with, ‘‘none of the uses count as causing
harm to patients’’ yet the harm is already done, and
you can’t measure it. People are withholding infor-
mation from their GPs, and have lost trust how their
data is used. There is harm caused by worry, which
you can’t count. The Guardian, 18.08.14
Now [the scheme is] on indefinite hiatus with a
shrinking number of GPs willing to take part in the
pilot and the BMA demanding opt-in for everyone….
Some surgeries are reporting hundreds of written opt-
outs. Would you say this has been a successful pro-
ject so far? From where I’m sat it’s a complete
shambles. …The NHS thought they could do this
without consent. They were wrong. Simply shouting
louder isn’t going to work, you need to engage and
stop patronising us. The Guardian, 20.08.14
Wrongful appropriation of personal property
Fifth, various citizens voiced the concern that personal
health data and medical files are personal property and that
the government does not have the right to appropriate such
data under the care.data scheme. The following quotes
highlight this concern:
The whole exercise is nothing more than this gov-
ernment selling off things which it does not own.
Care.data, 31.01.14
My medical records - and those of my children - are
my property. Neither the government nor the NHS
has the right to sell [them] either for profit or for the
advantage of private companies, business interests or
political advantage. Care.data, 31.01.14
I would like to know why they want my information,
what for, and who [it’s] likely to go to … It is polite
to ask us[,] they are our records[, and] if the bank did
this they would be fined. Care.data, 13.01.14
The NHS needs to think again on who owns medical
data (we the patients do) Care.data, 29.01.14
Commercialization
Sixth, various citizens express worries that personal health
data will be sold to third parties, including commercial
companies, and that commercial and for-profit activities
will be developed on the basis of their personal health data.
The following quotes reveal this concern:
… I’m outright fuming that a government organiza-
tion like the NHS can sell my personal data without
even asking for permission! Care.data, 23.02.14
Basically they have been selling it. Anything for a
few quid. Are the British public now a commodity for
this government … to sell? It will be tissue next.
Guardian, 18.06.14
In the past 2 years, a range of researchers and private
companies have applied and received sensitive
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medical information held by the NHS…. [W]ith the
promise of a nation-wide data pool, private compa-
nies will be queuing to get their hands on medical
records. Care.data, 16.01.14
Just wanted to add I would have considered this long
and hard if only the NHS had access to these
details… As soon as you add private companies to
the equation it loses its validity. Care.data, 16.01.14
I am so angry about this I thought our records were
private not up for auction to the highest bidder.
Care.data, 18.02.14
Uses of personal health data that conflict
with the person’s moral values
Finally, some citizens expressed worries about the potential
uses of personal health data for purposes that an individual
might consider unethical or inappropriate or, put differ-
ently, uses of personal health data that conflict with the
person’s moral values. For example:
While I may be willing to share all my data for the
purposes of improving health for the world at large, I
find the language used vague -most probably- on
purpose. There is no guarantee that my data will be
used ethically, All it says is that there are ‘‘strict rules
to protect’’ privacy. I want strict rules to protect my
data from being used in research relating to the cre-
ation, marketing or deployment of weapons; I want my
data to be protected from being sold to or shared with
companies which engage in the patenting of genome
products; I want my data to be protected from being
sold to or shared with companies that engage in abu-
sive hiring practices here and abroad; I want my data to
be protected from being sold or shared with companies
or individuals that treat the environment with con-
tempt; I want my data to be protected from being sold
to or shared with companies that have unacceptable
top executive salaries; and this is just a sample. I want
the data to be supervised by an independent forum of
individuals whose remit is to follow strict published
ethical guidelines relating to sharing, selling and profit
making by the use of my data. Care.data, 22.01.14
Citizens’ views on how to move forward:
promoting the common good and creating
transparency
The various concerns identified show that many citizens
are suspicious about how their data will be used. How will
citizens’ privacy be protected? What role do GPs have in
the possible misuse of data? Will governments misuse
citizens’ health data? Will these data be commercialised?
Will they be utilised with disregard for moral values? At
the same time, the analysed data shows that many citizens
would like to believe that sharing of health data may serve
the common good. This suggests that a desire to be good to
others, to be useful to others and to society, plays an
important role in decisions about the sharing of health data.
The following statements further hint at how important
these citizens believe is that they further the common good.
Expressions of concern for the ‘‘health of the world at
large’’ clearly point in that direction. Here are a few
statements illustrating this concern:
I do believe that there are potential benefits to data
sharing in general, as long as it’s used by the right
people for the right reasons. Care.data, 28.01.14
Consider questions like this[:] 1 - Does pill X lead to a
greater incidence of stoke/heart problems/cancer etc. 2
- Does smoking with pill y lead to particular issues? 3 -
Is a particular type of cancer more prevelant [sic] in a
particular area? If so is there anything else in those
peoples medical records to explain why? Questions of
this type, and more, can be answered by analysing mass
amounts of data, which isn’t available on this scale
otherwise. It’s invaluable for research and will help
improve the health of the nation. Care.data, 24.02.14
I do not want my data ending up in the hands of
corporations whose profit focus undermines the aims
and ethics of the NHS. Care.data, 28.02.14
A deliberate decision was made to sell our data to a
private company for purely commercial use, having
nothing whatsoever to do with improving medical
care or NHS services. This government has lied about
its intentions for the NHS, and continues to lie and
obstruct information about what it has done with it,
and what is going on as we speak. This is all really
too bad, because the existence of a large database like
the NHS has such obvious benefits. However this is
only where the NHS remains a public service, and
where the information is used to benefit the public.
NOT commercial businesses. The Guardian, 18.08.14
In response to the lack of adequate information and
transparency, many citizens plead for more and better
information provision. Instead of a general leaflet, various
citizens indicated the importance of being addressed
personally about data sharing.
It is sad that such important information is distributed
like this. This is so important for everyone to
understand what is happening, that it should have
been personally addressed to all. Care.data, 31.01.14
I strongly object to the way patients are actually
being informed about this. Today I received the
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leaflet ‘Better information means better care’ together
with a load of junk mail which I could have easily
binned. I suspect many people will not give it a
second look. There should have been some personal
correspondence from one’s GP practice informing
patients about this rather than a mailshot. Care.data,
21.01.14
Ethical concerns raised in the Privacy Impact
Assessments of the care.data scheme
As mentioned earlier, with regard to governmental ICT
schemes, the UK government has a long tradition of
commissioning so-called ‘Privacy Impact Assessments’.
Thus, the HSCIC28 and NHS England29 have each pro-
duced a Privacy Impact Assessment in relation to the
potential impacts on patient privacy of the operations of the
HSCIC and of the care.data scheme respectively. The
care.data Assessment produced by NHS England is par-
ticularly relevant for the purposes of this paper, for two
reasons.
The first reason has to do with the extent to which the
Assessment acknowledges ethical concerns relating to the
care.data scheme, several of which are clearly similar to
citizens’ concerns discussed above. This can be seen from
the following passages:
The [HSCA] … sets aside the requirement under the
common law duty of confidence to seek patient
consent. … The extraction of personal confidential
data from [health service] providers without consent
carries the risk that patients may lose trust in the
confidential nature of the health service. (page 6)
Some people may feel a loss of individual autonomy
(no patient consent) … Some patients may not be
aware of or understand their choices. (page 8)
[T]he potential risks to privacy from care.data are:
A. Loss of individual autonomy from use of patient
identifiable data without consent
B. Risk of confidential information being accessed
and viewed without knowledge or consent of patients
C. Linking and de-identification processes may not be
reliable enough to achieve total anonymisation of
data
D. Risk of data being accessed illegally and then sold
or otherwise misused by commercial organisations,
criminals or others; and
E. Risk of data being accessed legally and then the
data being misused. (page 15)
[T]he processing of a person’s information without
their permission can be considered a loss of auton-
omy for that individual. (page 23)
The second reason why the care.data Privacy Impact
Assessment produced by NHS England is relevant to our
discussion, has to do with what the supposed ‘opt-out’
model of the care.data scheme really means. Despite
containing assurances to the contrary, the care.data Privacy
Impact Assessment makes it clear that patients registering
their wish to opt out of the scheme to make their medical
information available for research, will not have those
wishes respected. The Assessment contains such reassuring
statements as:
To mitigate against the risk [that patients may lose
trust in the confidential nature of the health service],
the NHS constitution gives patients the right to object
to their personal confidential data leaving their GP
practice. In line with the commitment given by the
Secretary of State for Health in April 2013, patient
objections will be upheld other than in exceptional
circumstances such as a public health emergency.
(page 6, emphasis added)
Patients can object to the processing of the personal
confidential data in GP records. (page 8)
Put simply, patients who are concerned about their
privacy can now control the flow of confidential data
both out of their GP practices and out of the HSCIC.
(page 13, emphasis added)
The HSCIC and NHS England will respect the wishes
of patients who request that their data are not used by
care.data, unless there is a statutory duty or an
overriding public interest (e.g. public health emer-
gency) to do otherwise… (page 21)
However, despite these assurances, the Assessment makes
it clear that the GP data of those registering an opt-out will
be passed to the HSCIC and will most likely be used in
research to which those patients have not consented. Thus
the Assessment reports that:
Where patients have objected to the flow of their
personal confidential data from the general practice
record, the HSCIC will receive clinical data without
any identifiers attached (i.e., anoymised data). (page 9)
More particularly, the Assessment continues:
If a patient is (a) content for personal confidential
data from their GP record to be extracted into the
secure environment of the HSCIC but (b) objects to
flows of personal confidential data from the HSCIC
… then the HSCIC will extract the fact of the
objection, the date of the objection and the individ-
ual’s NHS number. The NHS number will be used
28 HSCIC, above, note 22.
29 NHS England, above, note 23.
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internally within the HSCIC to match these data to
other data held for that patient so that the data can be
anonymised before release. (page 10, emphasis
added)
In this context, by ‘anonymisation’ is in fact meant
‘pseudonymisation’, a ‘technique that replaces identifiers
with a pseudonym that uniquely identifies a person’ (page
31), i.e. what is frequently called ‘coding’ of health data.
Astonishingly, it appears that the NHS’s understanding is
that a patient’s wish that her confidential information is not
extracted or used, is respected by extracting and using the
data in pseudonymised form. This would undoubtedly
come as a surprise to most if not all citizens who have
opted out of the care.data scheme and therefore think that
their data will not be used in any way. We will come back
to this when making some recommendations below.
The difficult balancing of various interests
The discussions around the implementation of the care.data
scheme and the concerns raised by various professional
medical bodies and citizens illustrate the challenges
involved in finding a balance between on the one hand
aiming to improve the quality of care and health services
(as well as stimulating research) and on the other hand
respecting ethical values such as trust, respect for auton-
omy, transparency, and respect for confidentiality and
privacy.
Trust is critical in determining whether individuals will
support a programme such as the care.data scheme. Public
trust and public support are complex phenomena and various
factors play a role in the level of trust individuals have in
healthcare organizations, governmental entities and
research institutions.30 The various issues illustrated above
with numerous quotes show real concerns that exist among
citizens. These concerns should not be taken lightly by
anyone who finds public trust in such institutions important.
As argued by bioethicist Julian Savulescu with regard to
the use of leftover body material: ‘‘Each mature person
should be the author of his or her own life. Each person has
values, plans, aspirations, and feelings about how that life
should go. People have values which may collide with
research goals … To ask a person’s permission to do
something to that person is to involve her actively and to
give her the opportunity to make the project a part of her
plans. When we involve people in our projects without
their consent we use them as a means to our own ends.’’31
This is essential and it is one of the main reasons why it
really matters to study citizens’ concerns regarding care.-
data and to take their concerns seriously. This is important
not only from a sociological or political point of view but
also from an ethical point of view. Even if we put aside the
issue of whether the use of people as a means to an end
could be morally justified in some particular situations,
there is no doubt that people do not like to be used as
means to an end without their consent. They can be either
coerced into it, or manipulated, or both, but the point is that
all such options are resented.
It is clearly the manipulative element that some people
perceive in the care.data scheme that violates trust. Trust is
however essential for making the whole scheme work. This
is even more so because the entire scheme revolves around
health data. Indeed, in order to merit any trust and to be
trusted, those who acquire health data ought to make sure
that they respect the autonomy of individuals who are
expected to entrust them with their personal data.32
The principle of respect for autonomy is based on the
principle of respect for persons.33 Taking these principles
seriously implies that people should be offered appropriate
ways to (not) consent to have their health records included
in the central database, which in turn implies that trans-
parency is a crucial prerequisite. Moreover, not only to
avoid violations of the principle of respect for autonomy,
but also in order to earn and obtain citizens’ trust, it is
essential that the whole care.data scheme is transparent.
Transparency is key to trust and trust is key to making
care.data work. As we have seen, however, various criti-
cisms are connected to the lack of adequate information
and transparency with regard to the implementation of the
care.data scheme. This shows that prior consultation and
communication with local communities and interests
groups is crucial in contexts such as this.34 Participation of
the public may create more representative and accountable
policies, thereby ensuring a larger societal support for the
policies in question, which should not only reflect the
perspectives of medical professionals, academics and
politicians.35 The various criticisms expressed by citizens
as discussed above show the feeling that citizens have not
been taken seriously, either in the designing of the care.-
data scheme, or as regards their right to decide whether or
not to participate in the scheme.
30 Resnik (2011).
31 Savulescu (2000).
32 In this regard, it is interesting to note that the citizens’ concerns
discussed above show many interesting similarities with concerns
raised in the academic literature on health data privacy. See for
example Lowrance (2012), Taylor (2011), Lane and Schur (2010),
Bobrow (2013).
33 For an accessible explanation, see National Commission for the
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral
Research (1979).
34 Morone and Kilbreth (2003).
35 Litva et al. (2002).
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The issue of informed consent is certainly one of the
most controversial topics in the context of health care and
research. The various quotes above not only demonstrate a
lack of information regarding the care.data scheme, but
also show that citizens were denied decisional capacity.
Various citizens emphasised that a program such as
care.data should be on an ‘opt-in’ basis or at the very least
on a transparent and straightforward ‘opt-out’ basis.36 The
comments also highlight the importance these citizens
attach to being informed and being given the opportunity to
approve the use of their personal health data, to know who
outside the NHS would be using the data and for what
purposes.
Various criticisms were made regarding the potential
commercialisation of personal health data. Commerciali-
sation in this context could take at least two different
forms. First, where the HSCIC would be used as a profit
source by the UK government. In this regard, the HSCIC
reassures people that it will not make a profit from pro-
viding data to other organizations, but will only charge an
access fee to cover its costs.37 While this may look
unproblematic, it in fact means that commercial companies
have access to assets they have not themselves bought or
created and are thus being given a quasi-free commercial
boost by the UK government. To put NHS databases at the
disposal of industry, without requiring a ‘kick-back’ to
enhance the service that the NHS is set up to provide, is
inappropriate. A more just arrangement would need some
form of benefit-sharing, with benefit effectively passing
back to the UK citizenry. The mere fact that a new drug
might reach the market is not sufficient since this is true for
citizens of all other countries, whose health data has not
been mined by the companies in question. Instead, the
companies seeking access could be required to provide the
NHS with reduced access costs for the resulting drugs or
other health-related products.
A second form commercialisation could take is that the
entities who are given access to health data may themselves
use it for commercial purposes, e.g. pharmaceutical com-
panies using the data for R&D of drugs which will be sold
for profit. The quotes discussed above clearly show that
some citizens feel strongly uncomfortable about the fact
that the care.data scheme allows commercial companies to
have access to their data. According to various
international recommendations, researchers should inform
research subjects about potential commercial uses of their
biological samples and data.38 These recommendations are
partly inspired by the fact that various studies indicate that
people may consider commercial uses to be at odds with
their original motivation to participate in research (and this
is the case even when they explicitly agreed to take part in
research).39 Indeed, transparency regarding the potential
commercial uses of personal health information is
warranted.
Research has shown that the general public is generally
positive towards medical research and is usually willing to
participate without expecting any personal benefit.40 The
willingness to participate decreases however if the benefits
to society are unclear or if private profits might be
derived.41
In this context it might also be useful to refer to the
ongoing debates on newborn bloodspot cards that are col-
lected in the framework of newborn screening. These
bloodspots represent a unique resource for biomedical
research and public health surveillance and constitute a
valuable resource for a better understanding of the role
played by the environment in the development of common
diseases, and would allow comparisons between children
growing up in different environments. However, recent
lawsuits about sample storage and lack of parental consent
for the storage of the samples and for their use in research
have had a negative spillover effect on the presumed
consent basis of newborn bloodspot screening itself and
have led to the destruction of valuable collections of
bloodspot cards. Driven by patient advocacy groups, vari-
ous lawsuits have taken place over the last years in Texas
and Minnesota. For example, in Texas, five families sued
the Texas Department of Health Services for storing
bloodspot cards indefinitely and using them for undisclosed
research purposes without parental permission. In response
to the lawsuit, the Texas newborn screening laws were
changed to authorise the retention of the samples, and the
lawsuit was settled. In the negotiated settlement, Texas
agreed to destroy five million samples that had been
retained without parental consent before the new legisla-
tion took effect.42
Even though the US Office for Human Research Pro-
tections holds the position that research using only de-
36 The point might be raised that allowing opting-out, or requiring
opting-in, might result in an undesirable selection bias in the care.data
data set. This is indeed correct. However, such selection bias may
readily be adjusted for by random deselection of data sets from over-
represented patient categories, e.g. gender, age, location, condition,
etc. Selection bias is thus not an adequate reason for conscription of
patient data.
37 See http://www.nhs.uk/NHSEngland/thenhs/records/healthrecords/
Documents/FAQs-for-patients-vs5.pdf.
38 HUGO Ethics Committee (2002), Organization for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (2009), Canadian Institutes of Health
Research et al. (2010), European Society of Human Genetics (2003).
39 Skolbekken et al. (2005), Godard et al. (2007), Nilstun and
Hermere´n (2006).
40 Nicol and Critchley (2012).
41 Critchley et al. (2012), Kettis-Lindblad et al. (2006).
42 Lewis et al. (2012), Hu (2012).
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identified materials falls outside the definition of ‘‘human
subjects research’’, thus allowing the use of anonymised
archival materials for research without consent, the use of
stored newborn blood spots for research has stirred up
much controversy and, as mentioned, even litigation in the
US. Contrary to what some might argue, anonymisation
and pseudonymisation (or coding) of health data does not
overcome all objections and concerns that individuals
have.43 Controversies such as the one surrounding newborn
bloodspot cards might be instructive for those responsible
for designing programmes such as the care.data scheme.
They demonstrate the importance of providing information,
transparency, guaranteeing individuals’ right not to par-
ticipate, and preserving trust in the healthcare system and
its associated research programmes.
Concluding remarks
The concerns expressed by citizens regarding the care.data
scheme turn out to be remarkably similar to the concerns
expressed by the medical community. Moreover, not only
concerned citizens and the medical community have
identified these major flaws of the scheme: as is clear from
the Privacy Impact Assessment discussed above, NHS
England itself is fully aware that the care.data scheme
infringes on personal autonomy, even though this is the
guiding principle behind the requirement for consent, itself
a foundation stone for modern medicine and research.
Our most important recommendations for redesigning
the scheme would be the following. First, much more
transparency and clarity need to be created regarding the
existence of the scheme as well as its goals and implica-
tions. As discussed earlier in the section providing the
background to the care.data scheme, the meaning and
boundaries of the amendments made to the Health and
Social Care Act remain unclear, for example as regards the
kinds of third parties to whom access to the data will be
sold and for what kinds of purposes. This makes it
impossible for citizens to make an informed decision as to
whether they want their health records to be transferred to
the database.
Our second recommendation would be that, if selling
access to the database to third parties remains part of the
scheme (and we have no reason to think that this is being
rethought), the UK government and the NHS should
require a kick-back from industry. As explained earlier, the
HSCIC has declared that it will only charge third parties an
access fee to cover its costs. This implies that commercial
companies will be given very cheap access to assets they
have not themselves bought or created and thus receive a
quasi-free commercial boost by the UK government.
However, to put NHS databases at the disposal of industry,
without requiring a ‘kick-back’ to enhance the service that
the NHS is set up to provide, is clearly inappropriate. Some
form of benefit-sharing is necessary, with benefit effec-
tively passing back to the UK citizenry. For example, the
companies seeking access could at least be required to
provide the NHS with reduced access costs for drugs or
other health-related products resulting from R&D that
relied (among other sources) on information obtained from
the HSCIC.
Our third recommendation is that the scheme should be on
an ‘opt-out’ basis. An ‘opt-out’ or presumed consent system
is not necessarily ethically problematic. Although opt-in or
explicit consent is clearly the default option when research
involves humans (and/or their body material and related
data), when potential risks are minimal and potential benefits
are huge, exceptions to this rule can be allowable. As to risks,
in its current form, care.data clearly involves far more than
minimal risks. Whether these risks can be reduced to minimal
risks will depend on whether or not the necessary changes
will be made to the scheme. If and when that is done, a
presumed consent model could be justified for care.data on
the basis of its potential benefits. Indeed, there is no doubt that
bringing together, linking and sharing large collections of
health data has significant potential benefits. It holds great
promise for the development of diagnostic, therapeutic and
disease-preventing strategies. The discussion in this paper
clearly shows that these potential benefits are acknowledged
not only by the medical community but also by many con-
cerned citizens. Hence, provided that the first and second
recommendations above are met, an ethical case could be
made for grounding the scheme on an opt-out rather than an
opt-in (i.e. explicit consent) basis. Indeed, in an entirely dif-
ferent context (i.e. the case of post mortem organ removal) it
has been pointed out, rightly in our view, that a presumed
consent system does not in any way restrict a person’s right to
self-determination, as long as the person is aware of the
nature of the system, is aware of the specific implications of
not opting out and those of opting out, is allowed a reasonable
time period in which to opt out, and is offered adequate and
straightforward means of formally recording their opt-out.44
However, none of these conditions appear to be met in
the case of the care.data scheme, hence consent simply
cannot be presumed. Moreover, alarmingly, the scheme is
not even in fact based on an opt-out regime, since a
patient’s wish that her confidential information is not
extracted or used, is met by extracting and using the data in
pseudonymised form. This is clear from the Privacy Impact
Assessments discussed earlier. Moreover, the HSCIC itself
makes this crystal clear. In its responses to Frequently
43 Van Assche et al. (2013). 44 Den Hartogh (2008).
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Asked Questions, it provides the following answer to the
question ‘‘Can I stop information that does not identify me
being used?’’:
No. Information that does not identify you is neither
personal nor private and the law says that it can
therefore be used much more freely.45
This makes a mockery of the reassurance by the UK
government that citizens can opt out of the care.data
scheme. If somebody opts out, that should mean that their
data are simply not extracted and used, i.e. HSCIC should
receive no data, whether in non-identifiable (pseudony-
mised or coded) form (i.e. still uniquely identifying the
person) or in anonymised form (i.e. not identifying the
person).
Again, we wish to emphasise that we have no problem
with an opt-out system for this kind of project. Our criti-
cism concerns precisely the fact that care.data is not based
on an opt-out but instead boils down to conscription. This
is unacceptable, for what is at issue here are people’s health
records, i.e. a lot is at stake. An opt-out model represents
what could be called the ‘ethical minimum’, for, as
explained in this paper, the care.data scheme may involve
serious infringements upon the privacy, autonomy, and
moral integrity of NHS patients. Indeed, the health data
may be used in a way that is incompatible with the moral
values of the patient concerned. Following Ronald Dwor-
kin’s (1993) terminology, so-called ‘critical interests’ may
be at stake.46 Such interests are bound in the projects, plans
and choices that persons have made and that give meaning
to their life. It is important for the individual that others
respect these and do not take actions that will critically
impact on them in a negative way. From this perspective,
people are entitled to their health data being used in a
manner that corresponds to their life story and ethical
values. As the US National Bioethics Advisory Commis-
sion already observed with regard to human body material
in 1999, anonymization (of the material or data) cannot
invalidate this claim.47 Failure to respect this would
amount to using people as a means to an end they have not
chosen, i.e. instrumentalization.48
Clearly, nothing valuable can be achieved if citizens
believe that they are purposefully ill-informed with the aim
of disguising various types of problematic practices. It fol-
lows from the reactions to care.data of citizens and medical
professionals discussed above, that, in order to earn and
retain citizens’ trust, the specific concerns identified in this
paper need to be addressed in the light of the common
values that citizens wish to promote, including the value of
furthering the common good. These values need to be fur-
thered on the basis of sufficient and transparent information
and an absence of misleading practices of any sort.
As we have argued, the essential starting point is trust. In
order to merit any trust and to be trusted, those who are the
guardians of citizens’ health data ought to make sure that
they respect the autonomy of the people who are expected to
trust them with that data. NHS patients should not have any
fear that they are being manipulated into sharing their health
data, i.e. that they are being used as a means to an end. It is
precisely this starting point of trust that has been overlooked
from the outset in the design of the care.data scheme. It is to
be hoped that the concerns discussed in this paper will be
dealt with before a truly transparent and trustworthy version
of the scheme is launched.
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